Authorized Investigation: A Temperate Alternative to
Cyber Insecurity
Casey M. Bruner*
“Wage war honorably.
You may be obliged to wage war but not to use poison arrows.”1
-Baltasar Gracián
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, “Operation Shady RAT” became universally known as one
of the most widespread and pervasive cyber espionage campaigns ever
discovered.2 The security breach, which persisted over a five-year period,
infected more than seventy organizations worldwide including: federal
and state government entities, high-tech and communications businesses,
thirteen different national defense contractors, and the International
Olympic Committee, among others.3 The Operation Shady RAT vulnerability promulgated the way most computer viruses do: through an email
and an attachment.4 An employee of one of the infected defense contractors received an email with an Excel file attached.5 The file contained a
*
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1. BALTASAR GRACIÁN, THE ART OF WORLDLY WISDOM 67 (Joseph Jacobs trans., Dover
Publications 2005) (1653).
2. See DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, MCAFEE, REVEALED: OPERATIONS SHADY RAT (2011),
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf; see also WILLIAM C.
HANNAS ET AL., CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE: TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION AND MILITARY
MODERNIZATION 220 (2013) (stating that some experts believe that the “Shady RAT” vulnerability
originated in China).
3. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Hon Lau, The Truth Behind the Shady RAT, SYMANTEC SECURITY RESPONSE BLOG (Aug. 4,
2011), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/truth-behind-shady-rat.
5. Kelly Jackson Higgins, ‘Operation Shady RAT’ Attackers Employed Steganography, DARK
READING (Aug. 11, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/operation-shadyrat-attackers-employed-s/231400084.
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list of high-level executives that recently attended a popular industry
event—useful information the employee was likely to open.6 When
opened, the file initiated backdoor communications with the hackers’
server allowing the hackers to access the contractor’s system and establish more footholds, ensuring long-term network access.7 With this access, hackers were able to steal trade secrets, specifications and designs
for classified defense technology, and anything else they were able to
find on the compromised organizations’ servers.8 While the pervasiveness of Operation Shady RAT may be shocking for some, experts insist
that this was merely one operation and that cyber espionage is a threat
that affects nearly every industry and every country—the only ones immune to attack are those without anything valuable to steal.9
In another striking example, the McAfee security company discovered an extensive cyber espionage campaign, dubbed “Night Dragon,”
which targeted global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies.10 Night
Dragon was more narrowly focused than Operation Shady RAT, in that it
specifically targeted “sensitive competitive proprietary operations and
project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field bids . . . .”11
The perpetrators of the Night Dragon operation were seeking information
on the amount of money major oil and energy companies would be bidding on various projects around the world. Armed with this information,
a country’s state-owned enterprises could theoretically underbid their
competitors by one dollar on each contract, effectively pushing the competition out of the market and taking all of the work.12
The vulnerability of our networks and computers, as evidenced by
these and other attacks, is resulting in the loss of petabytes13 of valuable
information, costing the U.S. economy billions of dollars, weakening its
ability to defend its own people, and compromising the integrity and reliability of its critical infrastructure.14 Why is this such a pervasive and
seemingly unfixable problem? What should be done about it? In response
6. Id.
7. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 2, at 2.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See McAfee Foundstone Professional Services & McAfee Labs, Global Energy
Cyberattacks:
“Night
Dragon”,
MCAFEE
(Feb.
10,
2011),
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf.
11. Id. at 3.
12. The Night Dragon attacks are believed by many security experts to have originated in China and could have been perpetrated on behalf of Chinese state-owned energy companies. See
HANNAS ET AL., supra note 2, at 220.
13. A petabyte is 1,000,000 gigabytes.
14. See infra Part III.B.
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to these questions, many security experts have concluded that the purely
defensive network protection measures of the past are insufficient and
are now urging private industries and governments to supplement their
security protocols with “active defense” or “hack-back” cyber defense
tools.15 Hack-back is a method of cybersecurity that involves some level
of retaliation, or “counterstrike,” against the hacker.16 While the desire
for hack-back measures is understandable given the magnitude of the
problem, the practice is fraught with potential collateral damage and privacy concerns.17 Nonetheless, some individuals and organizations have
already begun to implement this legally questionable practice.18
This Note aims to show that legal structures created to protect the
Internet in its original form are completely insufficient to protect what
the Internet has become. This antiquated legal framework is exacerbating
the problem. The breadth of activity that the current law restricts severely
limits the remedies that cyberattack victims can pursue, and it must be
updated.19 While full hack-back may prove necessary in the long run, I
argue for a more temperate initial response to the problem—I call this
response “authorized investigation.” Specifically, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act should be amended to allow victims access to their attackers’ computers for purposes of investigation without incurring criminal and civil liability.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the foundations,
original purposes, and philosophies that surrounded the inception of the
Internet and the legal framework that developed as a result. Part III discusses current cyberthreats, and the damage these threats can do to our
economic and national security infrastructures. Part IV discusses proposed methods of stopping and deterring cyberattacks, ranging from
purely defensive measures to full-blown hack-back. Finally, Part V proposes a model of “authorized investigation,” which would grant victims
15. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense
and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 415 (2012); Shane McGee et al., Adequate
Attribution: A Framework for Developing a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active Defense, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2013); Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory
Hacking by Non-State Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2013).
16. See infra Part IV.B.
17. See McGee et al., supra note 15, at 43.
18. Stewart Baker, RATs and Poison: Can Cyberespionage Victims Counterhack?, SKATING
ON STILTS (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-stilts/2012/10/us-law-keepsvictims-from-counterhacking-intruders.html. See also Jeremy Wagstaff, More Companies Hacking
Back at Cyber Attackers, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 9, 2015, 1:36 PM),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/more-companies-hacking-back-cyber-attackers.
19. See infra Part II.A.
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of cyberattacks limited authorization to access and investigate computers
used in the attack.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1972, at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Washington, D.C., a
group of scientists, engineers, and researchers came together for the first
ever International Computer Communications Conference. Also in attendance was a government engineer, Robert Kahn, who worked for the
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA)—a small unit established
by President Eisenhower to pursue scientific advancement beyond
short-term military need.20 More simply, ARPA was created to ensure
that the U.S. military possessed the world’s most advanced technology.21
Kahn was there to demonstrate ARPA’s newest achievement: a group of
twenty computers, all networked together and able to communicate with
each other through a revolutionary “packet switching” technology—
ARPANET, the first computer network, was born.22
ARPANET, which would eventually develop into the Internet as we
know it today, was the brainchild of a small network consisting of the
federal government, universities, and research centers.23 Its initial functions were exclusively to facilitate collaborative research and scientific
advancement and to help facilitate long-range governmental and military
communications, particularly in times of national security crises.24 In
fact, commercial Internet use was banned until 1992.25 In the
mid-1990s—after the commercial Internet ban was lifted—computers
and Internet use and access was only practically accessible to a few.26
The limitations on the type and quantity of Internet users—as well as the
20. See Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Number 5105.15 (Dep’t
of Defense Feb. 7, 1958) (“In accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of
1947, . . . there is established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Department of Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency. . . . The Agency shall be responsible for the direction or performance of such advanced projects in the field of research and development as the Secretary of
Defense shall [designate] . . . .”).
21. ARPA is still in existence but is now known as DARPA. See ARPA-DARPA: The Name
Chronicles, DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/ARPA-DARPA__The_Name_
Chronicles.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
22.
See
Brief
History
of
the
Internet,
INTERNET
SOC’Y,
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2015).
23. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 82 (2011).
24. Id.; see also JOEL BRENNER, GLASS HOUSES: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND CYBER INSECURITY
IN A TRANSPARENT WORLD 15 (2013).
25. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 82.
26. Id.
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assumption that the Internet would be used only for morally upright purposes—led to an intentionally “lawless” and “government-free” Internet.27
As the Internet grew in breadth and accessibility, early attempts at
government regulation were treated with great hostility. One of the early,
significant attempts to regulate the Internet and its content was the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).28 The CDA was intended
to protect children from obscene, indecent, and pornographic material on
the Internet.29 Advocates for “open-Internet” argued that the CDA’s
criminal provisions were overly broad and violated the First Amendment
to the Constitution.30 After the President signed the legislation, John Perry Barlow, an early open-Internet advocate, responded in his now famous
speech called the “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” by
proudly and defiantly declaring to governments around the world, “Your
legal concepts . . . do not apply to us.”31 The only governance necessary
to rule the Internet, according to Barlow, would come “from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal . . . .”32
This idea—that a system this complex could intentionally exclude
governance and operate on the naïve belief that its users would act ethically absent the rule of law—is one that has restricted the government
from maintaining any real order online and has removed all traces of the
centuries old common law defense-of-self and defense-of-property concepts, both of which are well-established in both criminal33 and civil
law.34 As a result, the legal framework that exists, built on a handful of
27. One of the four principles set out by Robert Kahn for how information transition would
take place over the networks was “[t]here should be no global control at the operations level.” Id.
Additionally, Larry Roberts, who wrote the code for an early version of the transmission protocol,
knew the code was insecure. Id. at 83. However, at the time, the network was so small that it was not
a concern. Id.
28. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. 5, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43
(1996).
29. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (“[The law] prohibits the knowing transmission
of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.”).
30. The law was, in fact, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See id.
31. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
32. Id.
33. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 425 (2d ed. 2004) (“In general, one who is
free from fault may use force to defend his or her person or property against harm threatened by the
unlawful act of another if: (i) the person cannot avoid the threatened harm without using defense
force or giving up some right or privilege; and (ii) the force used for this purpose is not excessive in
view of the harm which it is intended to prevent.”).
34. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 112 (12th ed. 2010) (“As in the case of self-defense, the privilege to defend property is
limited to the use of force reasonably necessary to the situation as it appears to the defendant.”).
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broad, ambiguous statutes and little case law, tips the balance of power
unquestionably in favor of those who intend to use the Internet for harm.
Additionally, there is little remedial action available to responsible users
who are wronged. Criminal statutes do little to deter cybercriminals,
while law-abiding citizens are unable to legally defend themselves. Had
stronger governance of the Internet been allowed early on, perhaps there
would be more effective policing of cybercrime today. Alternatively, had
the Internet been left without “legal concepts,” in a Hobbesian state, private individuals would have the ability to defend themselves without fear
of criminal prosecution or civil suit. Ironically, by aiming for the middle
ground, and trusting that only “good” people would use the Internet, the
current system appears to be a combination of the worst of both worlds.
A handful of statutes now govern the way users, good or bad, may
act in the cyberspace realm; two of these statutes are the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA)35 and the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA).36 Also relevant are the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
(EEA)37 and section 1637 of the National Defense Authorization Act of
2015.38 Each of these statutes, in its own way, tips the scale of network
defense in favor of cybercriminals and cyberspies and against those trying to protect their own networks.
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The CFAA criminalizes a wide variety of actions related to the unauthorized access or misuse of computers.39 In its broadest provision, the
CFAA provides: “Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer . . . shall be punished . . . .”40 The statute defines “protected computer” as “a computer . . . which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication, including a computer located outside the United
States . . . .”41 Experts have aptly noted that the statute covers nearly any
computer connected to the Internet from any location.42 Because any unauthorized access, or any activity that exceeds authorization, is a viola35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2001).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013).
38. National Defense Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1637, 128 Stat. 3292
(2014).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
40. Id. § 1030(a) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
42. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 492.
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tion of the statute, it appears interaction with any computer without authorization is a violation of the CFAA.43 In a striking example of the
CFAA’s immense breadth, federal prosecutors, attempting to find novel
avenues to combat the growing and serious epidemic of cyberbullying,
argued that Lori Drew violated the CFAA when she created a MySpace
account under the name and profile picture of a fictitious person44—a
violation of MySpace’s Terms of Service (ToS).45 However, after the
jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial judge overturned the conviction
and declared the interpretation of the law invalid under the void-forvagueness doctrine.46
In addition to the CFAA’s overly broad criminal provisions, the Act
also provides for a civil cause of action, allowing the victim to sue the
hacker for any violation of the CFAA’s felony provisions for compensatory damages or equitable relief.47 However, these claims can only be
brought against a known violator.48 Given the current state of traceback
technology,49 and the stringent service of process requirements for international actors, the CFAA is unlikely to have any significant deterrent
effect or provide any substantial relief to victims of cyberattacks. The
CFAA does, however, dissuade legitimate actors from acting in
self-defense because they fear potential criminal prosecution for nearly
any retaliatory measures taken.
Finally, in a brief nod to cyber defense, the CFAA grants a very
limited exemption to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of criminal investigation, yet it provides no investigative authority to the actual
victims of cyberattacks.50 Therefore, a company that was attacked, and
43. Stewart Baker, RATs and Poison II—The Legal Case for Counterhacking, SKATING ON
STILTS (Oct. 13, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://www.skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-stilts/2012/10/ratpoison-the-legal-case-for-counterhacking.html.
44. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Drew allegedly, with others,
created a profile of “Josh Evans,” who began an online relationship with Megan Meier. Id. Later,
“Josh” began bullying Megan. Id. Megan later committed suicide. Id.
45. Id. at 454. MySpace’s terms of service require that “all registration information you submit
is truthful and accurate . . . .” Id. Therefore, according to the prosecutors, submitting any false registration information to MySpace was a criminal act under the CFAA. Id.
46. Id. at 467 (“In sum, if any conscious breach of a website’s terms of service is held to be
sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or in excess
of authorization, the result will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law ‘that affords too much
discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].’”) (quoting
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999)).
47. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 491.
48. See id. at 494.
49. Current traceback technology currently boasts, at best, 87% accuracy. However, tracing an
attacker is often made more difficult, and more inaccurate, by anti-tracing measures such as
IP-spoofing. Id. at 481–82.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2008).
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potentially had valuable trade secrets or sensitive customer information
stolen, may not interact with the hacker’s computer in an “unauthorized”
manner without facing criminal liability. Clearly, the CFAA provides
little disincentive to criminal actors, but severely limits the defensive
remedies available to those who wish to operate within the law.
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA prohibits:
(1) the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications
(wiretapping); (2) access to the content of stored electronic communications and to communications transaction records; and (3) the
use of trap and trace devices and pen registers.51

Generally, the ECPA prohibits the interception or monitoring of phone
and Internet communication.52 However, the ECPA does provide some
exemptions, including a general exemption for phone and Internet service providers who intercept, disclose, or use information while engaged
in any activity that is “a necessary incident to the rendition of his service[,]” such as “mechanical or service quality control checks.”53 Thus,
while an Internet service provider can monitor traffic over its network to
ensure that its services are working correctly, an Internet service provider
may not, absent a court order, share this information with law enforcement.54 As a result, service providers can sometimes see—in real time—
cyberattacks happening over their networks, but cannot do anything
about it; additionally, the U.S. intelligence community, which has proprietary intelligence on current cyberthreats, cannot share this information with industry actors.55 The result is a worldwide network where
cybercriminals can move about and conduct their activities, while neither
private service providers nor intelligence communities may inform the
other about what is happening.
The proposed Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
(CISPA) intends to eliminate this legal barrier to communication be51. See EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42409, CYBERSECURITY: SELECTED
LEGAL ISSUES 20 (2013) (footnotes omitted), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42409.pdf.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2008).
54. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii).
55. U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE
ROGERS-RUPPERSBERGER CYBERSECURITY BILL (H.R. 624) 1 (2013), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/images/BackgrounderApril172013.pdf
.
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tween industry and government.56 CISPA would grant Internet service
providers and government agencies limited authority to share anonymous
cyberthreat information with each other to better protect their networks.57
Congressional consideration of CISPA, like other Internet-related laws,
has been met with great hostility from many privacy advocates, despite
the bill’s extensive civil protection and privacy measures.58 Because
CISPA passage and implementation would only allow for better coordination against cyberthreats—without increasing the tools for defense
against those threats—it will only marginally help secure cyberspace.59
While better information sharing is necessary, it is only part of the solution.
C. The Economic Espionage Act
Congress responded to the rise in international intellectual property
theft by passing the EEA of 1996.60 When President Clinton signed the
legislation, he stated that the new law “will help us crack down on acts
like software piracy and copyright infringement that cost American businesses billions of dollars in lost revenues. And it will advance our national security.”61
In actuality, the law has little to do with piracy, copyright infringement, or national security. The EEA criminalized two distinct actions: (1)
economic espionage, and (2) the theft of trade secrets.62 Economic espionage is defined as stealing, misappropriating, or receiving trade secrets
while “intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent . . . .”63 Trade secret theft, on the other hand, is defined as stealing, misappropriating, or

56. U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, MYTH V.
FACT: H.R. 624, THE CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT (CISPA) (2013),
available
at
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/cispamythvfact04172013.p
df.
57. See id.
58. See The NSA’s Favorite Anti-Privacy Law, CISPA, Is Back, FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE,
http://www.cispaisback.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
59. As of this writing, CISPA failed to pass the 113th Congress. With the retirement of Representative Mike Rogers, the bill’s primary advocate, it seems unlikely to pass in the next Congress.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013).
61. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (Oct. 11,
1996), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52087.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013); 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013).
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receiving trade secrets “with intent to convert [the] trade secret . . . to the
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof . . . .”64
Although the EEA could be used to bring criminal charges against
hackers, doing so is problematic for a number of reasons. The first problem is attribution. Like many civil actions proposed as cybertheft deterrents, it is extremely difficult to identify the perpetrator of a cyberattack;
it is difficult to sue someone who you cannot identify. Without additional
investigative tools, identifying the hacker is unlikely to happen with the
level of certainty required to bring criminal charges under the EEA.
Even if the hacker could reasonably be identified, adequate service
of process is problematic. This has been problematic for prosecutors under the EEA even when the alleged espionage was committed in the
physical world.65 Most cases classified as cyber espionage originate
overseas, with a disproportionate amount coming from China and Russia.66 In one case of Chinese industrial espionage, federal prosecutors
attempted to serve a Chinese company for trade secret theft by serving
the company’s U.S. subsidiary.67 The trial court judge found that service
was improper and quashed the indictment.68
More recently, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five Chinese
hackers for their cyberspying.69 It is widely assumed that no prosecutions
will take place because of similar jurisdictional issues.70 With most of the
defendants outside of the United States, the EEA is unlikely to result in
significant prosecutions and will therefore provide little deterrent effect
to cyberspies. As a whole, the EEA has been largely ineffective and has
not resulted in any significant international or economic cyber espionage
deterrence.
D. Section 1637 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015
At the end of 2014, Congress gave the Obama Administration another tool to combat industrial and economic espionage in cyberspace.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 contained a small pro64. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012).
65. See United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
66. See VERIZON, 2013 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 22 (2013), available at
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_
en_xg.pdf.
67. Pangang Grp. Co., 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
68. Id. at 1069.
69. RICHARD J. ELLINGS, NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN RESEARCH, FIVE CHINESE MILITARY
OFFICERS
INDICTED.
NOW
WHAT?
(May
22,
2014),
available
at
http://nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/ETA/Ellings
_FiveIndicted_052214.pdf.
70. Id.
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vision expanding the President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.71 Under this new authority, the President
can list people, companies, or organizations that fit the statute’s definition of cyberspies and ban them from sending or receiving payments
through the U.S. financial system.72
This legislation intends to change the incentive structure in countries known to engage in economic espionage in cyberspace.73 While the
new power may be useful on some level, the attribution problem persists.
As discussed later in this Article, it is nearly impossible to identify the
perpetrators of most cyberattacks.74 If we do not know who is doing the
hacking, we do not know whom to sanction.
****
These legal provisions, and the cyberlaw landscape generally, have
created an extremely fragile and unhealthy system on which we have
built our entire economic, national security, and critical infrastructure
systems.75 This system is plagued with a wide variety of cyberthreats
detrimental to both individuals and the country as a whole.
III. TYPES OF CYBERTHREATS & THEIR EFFECTS
A. Types of Threats
The number of threats that exist in cyberspace are as numerous and
varied as the people therein. However, the motivations for cyberattacks
can generally be broken down into three categories: hacktivism, economic, and espionage.76
1. Hacktivism
Individuals engaged in hacktivism, known as “hacktivists,” are
generally hackers motivated by ideological beliefs, not by material benefit.77 Sometimes, however, they are simply honing their hacking skills, or

71. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2014).
72. National Defense Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1637, 128 Stat. 3292
(2014).
73. Testimony of Former U.S. Senator Slade Gorton Before the House Energy & Commerce
Committee, IP COMMISSION (July 9, 2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/press/Gorton_Testimony
_070913.pdf.
74. See infra Part IV.B.
75. Joel Brenner, former senior counsel at the National Security Agency, uses the metaphor of
a “glass house” to describe the Internet and related systems. See generally BRENNER, supra note 24.
76. See VERIZON, supra note 66, at 20–21.
77. Id. at 21.
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even hacking for “fun and epic lulz,” as one security firm put it.78 While
hacktivists have often been classified as low-level “script-kiddies,”
hacktivism is becoming increasingly sophisticated.79
One of the best-known examples of hacktivism is the widely publicized saga of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and Anonymous. Assange
founded WikiLeaks in 200780 and spent the next several years publishing
state and corporate secrets that were, at best, embarrassing and at worst,
highly compromising to the safety and security of individuals worldwide.81 In 2010, WikiLeaks released its largest trove of secrets to date:
the Afghan War Diary, a “compendium of over 91,000 reports covering
the war in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010.”82 Many groups—including
some who do not generally see eye to eye on the issue of security leaks—
criticized the uncensored information dump as irresponsible.83
The backlash against WikiLeaks, and against Assange’s professional and personal conduct, was widespread.84 A number of countries, including WikiLeaks’ home country of Iceland, quickly became “unfriendly” to the Internet icon.85 Meanwhile, PayPal froze the accounts of donors to WikiLeaks, and many banks refused to process transactions for
the group, including Bank of America, MasterCard, Visa, and others.86
Hacktivists from around the globe came to WikiLeaks and Assange’s
defense. At the forefront of the counter-campaign was the cyberanarchist
group known as Anonymous,87 who launched “Operation Avenge
Assange.”88 Using an advanced Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)
attack, Anonymous was able to temporarily take down PayPal, Master-

78. Id.
79. See AKAMAI, THE STATE OF THE INTERNET 3D QUARTER, 2012 REPORT 5 (David Belson
ed., 2012).
80. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 171. As Julian Assange said, “I am the heart and soul of this
organization, its founder, philosopher, spokesperson, original coder, financier, and all the rest.” Id. at
173.
81. For example, included in the 2010 release of the Afghan War Diary were the names of
many Afghan citizens who cooperated with NATO forces and exposed members of the Taliban
during the ongoing conflict. Shortly after the leaks, the Taliban announced that they had set up a
commission to discover the identities of those spying for NATO. Id. at 172.
82. Id. at 171.
83. Examples include Reporters Without Borders and the head of the NSA. Id. at 172.
84. In August 2010, the Swedish government issued an arrest warrant for Assange alleging the
rape of two women. Id. at 174.
85. Id. at 173.
86. Id. at 175.
87. “We are Anonymous. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.” Id.
88. Id.
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Card, Bank of America, a Swiss bank, and the office of the Swedish
prosecutor.89
The most recent example of hacktivism came at the end of 2014.
Sony Pictures intended to release the movie “The Interview” on Christmas Day. The movie was a fictional portrayal of an absurd assassination
attempt of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In preemptive retaliation,
North Korean hackers attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment, obtaining
private emails, personal employee information, and more.90
Regardless of their motivations, or the sometimes-laudable nature
of their actions,91 hacktivists are defined by their lack of interest in financial gain. Instead, they are interested in pushing a social agenda at any
cost and they do so in a cyberworld that gives them freedom with little
fear of criminal charges. Even the U.S. courts have begun to realize what
little power they have over amorphous, non-state cyberactors.92
2. Economic Crime
Cyberattacks classified as financial crimes represent, by far, the
highest percentage of online threats.93 Organized crime groups conduct
most of these illicit activities.94 In the short-term, these cybercriminals
target ATMs, point of sale (POS) machines, and desktops to commit
payment fraud and steal identities.95 A recent example of this type of
hack is the data breach of retail store Target’s POS terminals.96 In a nineteen-day security breach over the high-volume holiday shopping season,
hackers pilfered data from approximately 70 million customers.97
89. Id.
90. Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Attributes Cyberattack on Sony to North Korea, WASH. POST (Dec.
19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-attributes-sony-attack-tonorth-korea/2014/12/19/fc3aec60-8790-11e4-a702-fa31ff4ae98e_story.html.
91. For example, in June 2013, Anonymous attempted to hack the North Korean government in
an attempt to learn more about their military and weapons systems. See Max Fisher, Hacker Group
Anonymous is No Match for North Korea, WASH. POST (June, 27, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/27/hacker-group-anonymous-is-nomatch-for-north-korea/.
92. See Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(court finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dissolving its own temporary restraining order). The decision unlocked the wikileaks.org domain and re-enabled the website. Id. The court
could not accurately determine the citizenship of the defendants and, therefore, was unable to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
93. See VERIZON, supra note 66, at 6.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 20, 22 tbl.1.
96. Mathew J. Schwartz, Target Breach Widens: 70 Million Warned, DARK READING (Jan. 10,
2014, 11:50 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/target-breach-widens-70million-warned/d/d-id/1113392.
97. Id.
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Although security breaches on par with the Target breach may seem
few and far between, it is likely that similar attacks will increase in frequency due to recent technology changes. In April 2014, Microsoft ended support for Windows XP, including software updates and security
patches.98 Although this is standard practice for businesses,99 due to its
stability, Windows XP has been the preferred operating system for specialized machines including POS systems, medical devices, and many
others.100 After April 2014, however, security holes that are discovered
will go unpatched, leaving these systems vulnerable.101
The long-term goal of cybercriminals is to convert the information
they gather to cash.102 The majority of financial attacks originate from
the United States or Eastern European countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation.103 Because a sophisticated cyberattack
requires a significant amount of effort and skill, and the value of a stolen
identity may not be immediately recognizable, it would seem that cyber
financial crime is not a lucrative business. However, some of these criminal operations are so vast, and the volume of information gathered so
great, the data retrieved generates millions of dollars.
The most notable example of organized cybercrime is the former
international syndicate known as Shadowcrew. Co-founded by Andrew
Mantovani, Shadowcrew was an online marketplace and hacker forum
where members could learn the trade, obtain people’s personal identification, sell the information to other identity thieves, and launder their money.104 It was a one-stop-shop for cybercriminals and identity thieves. Before the Secret Service took down Shadowcrew in 2004, the group acquired 1.5 million stolen credit card numbers and caused over $4 million
in real losses to credit card companies.105 While the Shadowcrew
takedown was largely hailed as a win for those cracking down on online
criminal activity, it is important to remember that the Shadowcrew web-

98. See Maxim Weinstein, The Dinosaur in the Room, DARK READING (Dec. 5, 2013, 9:42
AM), http://www.darkreading.com/sophoslabs-insights/the-dinosaur-in-the-room/240164462; Windows XP Support Has Ended, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/endsupport-help (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
99. See MICROSOFT, supra note 98. As a business creates new software, at some point it needs
to devote fewer resources to the software of the past.
100. Weinstein, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. See VERIZON, supra note 66, at 20.
103. Id. at 21.
104. Indictment, United States v. Mantovani, No. 2:04CR00786, 2004 WL 3609591 (D.N.J.
2004).
105. Id.
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site had nearly 4,000 members—the 2004 indictment charged only nineteen of them, and nine years later, three remain at large.106
3. State-Sponsored Economic Espionage & Trade Secret Theft
Espionage between governments is nearly as old as government itself. Economic and industrial espionage between companies is also
nothing new.108 Companies have long sought each other’s secrets in order to gain an economic advantage in the marketplace.109 However, espionage campaigns waged by state intelligence organizations for the purpose of helping their country’s economic actors gain an advantage in the
marketplace are relatively new. These state intelligence organizations are
especially prevalent in the cyber realm.
Unlike the widespread nature of cyber financial criminals, and the
first-world nature of hacktivists, state-sponsored cyber espionage is concentrated in a few countries that have both the capability to effectively
wage such a campaign and state involvement in industrial markets. The
countries most culpable for state-sponsored economic espionage are China and Russia.110
China’s national leaders considered the beginning of the 21st century to be an opportunity to generate significant national economic
growth.111 To help facilitate this growth, Chinese intelligence services
sought to exploit a variety of ways to steal trade secrets.112 A 2011 report
by the Office of the National Counter Intelligence Executive describes
107

106. See Lucian Constantin, Alleged Shadowcrew Member Extradited to U.S. 9 Years After
Cybercrime
Forum
Takedown,
PCWORLD
(July
2,
2013,
5:20
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2043498/alleged-shadowcrew-member-extradited-to-the-us-nineyears-after-forum-takedown.html.
107. “[I]t is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great results. . . . Spies are a
most important element in war, because on them largely depends an army’s ability to move.” SUN
TZU, THE ART OF WAR 99 (Lionel Giles trans., Dover Publ’ns 2002)
108. See, e.g., DENNIS C. BLAIR ET AL., COMM’N ON THEFT AM. INTELL. PROP., THE IP
COMMISSION REPORT, 40 (2013), available at http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_
Report_052213.pdf.
109. Id.
110. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION
AND
INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE,
2009–2011
4
(Oct.
2011),
available
at
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf;
see
also CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 139 (Oct. 12, 2012), available at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76190/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76190.pdf (“Chinese spy agencies have conducted a ‘far-reaching industrial espionage campaign’ in a range of industries, including biotechnology, telecommunications, nanotechnology, and clean energy.”).
111. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 110, at 5.
112. See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 110, at 139.
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Chinese actors as “the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of
economic espionage.”113 This disproportionate participation by Chinese
trade secret thieves is particularly evident in cyberspace. Industry reports
estimate that 96% of cyberattacks classified as “espionage cases,”114 and
one-third of those classified as “attack traffic,”115 originate in China.
China has held the top spot for attack traffic since 2011.116
Similarly, Russia, due to its “high dependence on natural resources,
the need to diversify its economy, and the belief that the global economic
system is tilted toward [the United States],” has begun using human intelligence, cyber espionage, and other operations to “collect economic
information and technology to support [its] economic development and
security.”117 However, while registering third in attack traffic, Russia
accounts for only roughly 5% of total attack traffic.118 As opposed to
China, most of Russia’s cyberattacks were financially motivated and affiliated with organized crime, not a state-sponsored agency.119 Unfortunately, experts believe that both China and Russia will remain “aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive US economic information and
technologies, particularly in cyberspace.”120
B. Effects of Cyber Insecurity
1. Economic Implications
The economic losses due to cyber insecurity are significant. First,
victims of cyberattacks suffer direct economic loss. In the Shadowcrew
example discussed previously, the group was able to obtain only 1.5 million fake credit cards resulting in $4 million dollars in real losses.121 In a
more recent sophisticated attack against Heartland Payment Systems (a
credit card processing company for merchants) hackers were able to obtain 130 million credit and debit card numbers.122 One can only speculate
at the real losses suffered by the Heartland attack.

113. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 110, at 5.
114. VERIZON, supra note 66, at 21.
115. See id.; See also AKAMAI, supra note 79, at 4 fig. 1.
116. See AKAMAI, supra note 79, at 5.
117. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 110, at 5.
118. See AKAMAI, supra note 79, at 4.
119. See VERIZON, supra note 66, at 22.
120. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 110, at ii.
121. Indictment, United States v. Mantovani, No. 2:04CR00786, 2004 WL 3609591 (D.N.J.
2004).
122. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 41.
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Second, companies and research institutions lose economically valuable assets, such as trade secrets, that are difficult to quantify. In 2013,
the cybersecurity firm Mandiant123 released a report exposing the persistent and ongoing cyber espionage campaigns waged by a “likely government-sponsored” group in China, now known as “Unit 61398.”124
Since 2006, Unit 61398 has compromised 141 companies spanning twenty major industries.125 The intelligence that the group obtained included
“technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results,
business plans, pricing documents,” and other information.126 In one
case, the group took 6.5 terabytes of information from a single company
over a ten-month period.127 However, as Mandiant points out: “The activity we have directly observed likely represents only a small fraction of
the cyber espionage” that the group conducted.128
Government officials have confirmed how prevalent the theft of
trade secrets has become. General Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of the U.S. military’s
newly established Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), stated that cyber
espionage “represents the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”129
Third, the indirect cost of cyber insecurity is the increased investment that companies and individuals must make to protect their data
from cyberthreats.130 These costs are particularly damaging to small
businesses because they incur nearly four times the per capita cost of
dealing with cyberattacks than large organizations.131
Finally, the most tangible loss is the loss of broad economic growth
and employment. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)
estimated that in 2009, trade secret theft by China alone cost the United

123. Mandiant was recently acquired by FireEye. Press Release, Mandiant, FireEye Announces
Acquisition
of
Mandiant
(Jan.
4,
2014),
available
at
https://www.mandiant.com/news/release/fireeye-announces-acquisition-of-mandiant/.
124. MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 2, available at
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Emil Protalinski, NSA: Cybercrime is the ‘Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History’,
ZDNET (July 10, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/nsa-cybercrime-is-the-greatesttransfer-of-wealth-in-history/.
130. See generally PONEMON INST., SECOND ANNUAL COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY (2011),
available at http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2011_2nd_Annual_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_
Study%20.pdf.
131. See id. at 13.
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States as much as $2.4 billion.132 The effect of international intellectual
property (IP) infringement on employment is striking: the USITC report
further estimated that if IP protection against China improved substantially, the U.S. economy would see an increase of 2.1 million jobs.133
Furthermore, the IP Commission estimates that the United States loses
$300 billion annually due to lost intellectual property.134
2. National Security Implications
The national security implications of an insecure cyber network are
just as significant, and in some ways more alarming, than the economic
implications. The prevalence of insecure networks and compromised
technology may threaten the United States’ ability to protect itself
against its enemies.
There are several ways cyber insecurity is undermining our national
security infrastructure. First, many of our military technology secrets are
drained through insecure networks. Operation Shady RAT, as discussed
above, penetrated thirteen different defense contractors.135 These defense
contractors were infected for periods ranging from one month to twentyone months.136 Significant amounts of classified military technology
specifications can be pilfered over a twenty-one month period. Suffice it
to say, our military technology will not remain effective if our enemies
know how the technology works and how to shut it down.
Second, a significant amount of military technology is built using
compromised technology. A 2012 study conducted by the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee discovered 1,800 cases where counterfeit
electronic parts were used in military technology.137 The total number of
counterfeit parts likely exceeds one million.138 These counterfeit parts are
used in various products, including missile defense systems, Air Force
planes and helicopters, and thermal sights for the Army.139 The Commit132. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 3-9 (May 2011),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf.
133. Id. at 4-4.
134. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 108, at 2. It is important to note that this figure also includes
intellectual property lost through non-cyber means.
135. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 2, at 4.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Press Release, U.S. Comm. on Armed Servs., Senate Armed Services Committee Releases
Report on Counterfeit Electronic Parts (May 21, 2012), available at http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/press-releases/senate-armed-services-committee-releases-report-on-counterfeitelectronic-parts.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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tee concluded, “The use of counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems
can . . . risk national security . . . .”140 “[M]ost experts cannot look at a
complicated computer chip and determine whether there is an extra piece
[of code] here or there, a physical trapdoor.”141 Thus, these counterfeit
parts could provide access points for hackers to exploit during conflicts.
Finally, the use of vulnerable technology and the inability to maintain secure networks is a liability in future military conflicts, as
cyberwarfare tactics are already being used in armed conflict.142 In 2008,
during Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead,” a cyberwar erupted between Israeli and Arabic state-sponsored hackers.143 Also in 2008, Russia invaded
Georgia in response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia.144 Just before
Russia began the armed conflict, a variety of cyberattacks began against
Georgian websites.145 Since the servers connecting Georgia to the outside
world—located in Russia and Turkey—were disabled or flooded with
attack traffic, Georgia lost connection to news and information sources,
was unable to communicate through email, and had to shut down its
banking system.146 The resulting confusion and lack of intelligence made
it difficult for Georgia to counter the Russian army.147 Finally, it is suspected that North Korea has begun testing its own cyberwarfare capabilities by attacking government sites in the United States and South Korea.148 Without secure networks, one can only imagine what
cyberwarfare tactics would be employed if two world powers entered
armed conflict.149
Some have argued that large-scale cyberwarfare could not occur between large militaries because of mutually assured destruction; the same
argument explains why militaries keep from engaging in nuclear war.150
However, because of the unique speed of cyberwar and its ability to disrupt communications and intelligence, there may be an incentive to at140. Id.
141. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 95.
142. See generally id. at ch. 3.
143. JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE CYBER UNDERWORLD 2 (Mike
Loukides ed., 2d ed. 2011).
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id.
146. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 19.
147. Id.
148. See CARR, supra note 143, at 4.
149. See Kevin Pollpeter, Controlling the Information Domain: Space, Cyber, and Electronic
Warfare, in STRATEGIC ASIA 2012-2013: CHINA’S MILITARY CHALLENGE 163, 172 (Ashley Tellis &
Travis Tanner eds., 2012) (“Cyberwarfare has emerged as the most pernicious threat from China. In
recent years, Chinese cyberwarfare units and civilian hackers have most likely conducted widespread and effective espionage against targets around the world.”).
150. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at xi.
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tack first if armed conflict seems imminent.151 Unless steps are taken
now to better secure U.S. networks, national security efforts may be undermined or seriously frustrated in a large-scale conflict.
3. Critical Infrastructure
In 2007, an electricity generator in Alaska began to vibrate at unusual speeds.152 It continued to do so until the turbines blew apart causing
the system to shut down.153 Although it appeared the damage was the
result of an explosive, it was really caused by hackers miles away.154
Luckily, this event was later identified as “Project AURORA,” an experiment by Idaho National Laboratory designed to test the security of our
critical infrastructure.155 Even though this was an authorized, controlled
experiment, it is indicative of the damage hackers could do to critical
U.S. infrastructure.
In the United States, manufacturing controls, electricity grids, banking and financial systems, telecommunications systems, air traffic control
systems, water supplies, sewage systems, and countless other critical infrastructure systems are electronically operated. Most of these electronically-operated systems are integrated into a larger system, which is vulnerable to attack. The National Intelligence Council has acknowledged
that cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could be seen by our enemies
as a way to attack the United States at home.156 Whether by accident,
terrorist attack, or the hands of bored script kiddies, the loss of any of
these systems—even for brief periods—could result in serious human
and economic costs.
The threat to critical infrastructure around the globe was one of the
biggest criticisms against the “hacktivist” group Anonymous.157 In a
2010 information dump, the group released a secret list of worldwide
critical infrastructure, including locations of hydroelectric plants, pharmaceutical companies that manufacture smallpox and other vaccines, and
undersea cables that connect the world’s communication system.158
While pieces of this information may have been publicly accessible from
various sources, broadcasting all of it in one place, to some, provided a

151. Id.
152. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 93.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. CARR, supra note 143, at 9–10.
157. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 174.
158. Id.
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blueprint for terrorists on how to do the most damage.159 The threat
against our critical infrastructure is significant, and damage to this infrastructure would affect all other aspects of our social, economic, and political structures. Without secure networks, it is only a matter of time before we experience a catastrophic loss of one of these essential systems.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Passive Defense
The law significantly limits what actions people may take in
self-defense against hackers, and criminal enforcement of cybercrime is
rare. As a result, most Internet users—from private individuals to
high-tech defense contractors—attempt to secure their computers and
networks using passive defense alone. Passive defense actions usually
fall into one or more of four categories: (1) controlling system access; (2)
limiting data access; (3) security administration; and (4) secure system
design.160 Some basic defensive actions include: requiring usernames and
passwords, installing anti-virus software and spam-filters, and encrypting
sensitive data. These passive defense methods are the functional equivalent of locking the door and hiding your valuables to deter burglars from
entering your house. However, without an effective police force or a
right of self-defense, it is only a matter of time before the burglars kick
down your door.
In order for passive measures to secure a system, they must work
100% of the time; otherwise, hackers will just keep trying until they succeed.161 In fact, experts have begun to argue that passive measures alone
are inadequate for long-term security.162 These defensive measures are
particularly inadequate against “zero-day” vulnerabilities—newly coded
threats that are unknown to software manufacturers and security professionals.163 Anti-virus software works by keeping a catalogue of known
virus code. When files that contain known malicious code are opened,
the anti-virus stops their execution. A newly coded zero-day virus and an
accidental opening of an attachment is all that is required to circumvent
even the most sophisticated passive defense networks. Without the ability to defend yourself and your property, and without belief that the po-

159. Id.
160. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 470.
161. Id. at 471.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 472.
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lice are on their way, it is only a matter of time before that burglar picks
the lock.
One version of passive defense that has garnered attention is the
idea of a “public health model” of cyber defense.164 Proponents of the
public health model suggest that the best way to secure the Internet as a
whole is to ensure the “health” of each of its citizens.165 Many
cyberattacks are committed using computers that belong to unassuming
third parties—also known as “Botnets.”166 For example, a DDOS attack
uses thousands of these computers to repeatedly send packets of information to a network server.167 The information overload crashes the
server, which is unequipped to deal with the deluge of data. This type of
attack is how Anonymous was able to bring down financial institutions.168 The hackers had access to thousands of “unhealthy” computers
that, at some point, were infected with malicious software that allowed
the hacker to access their system and send these data packets. In contrast,
DDOS attacks would be extremely difficult to execute if all computers
online were updated with the last anti-virus definitions and were clear of
malware because the hackers no longer have their “zombie army” or botnet.
There are two major difficulties encountered when implementing a
public health model. First, the model relies on the active and willing participation of all users. Each Internet participant must actively invest in
the latest security software, continually check for software patches,169
and knowledgably and actively avoid less reputable and potentially infectious Internet sites. As one security expert put it: security does not
work when it is left in the hands of the user.170
Second, the public health model assumes that viruses and exploits
occur naturally and independently; it does not account for actors actively
generating zero-day threats in order to overcome established defenses.
To take the public health metaphor to an extreme, this would be like
combatting a series of anthrax filled envelopes by instructing citizens to
164. See generally SCOTT CHARNEY, MICROSOFT, COLLECTIVE DEFENSE: APPLYING PUBLIC
HEALTH MODELS TO THE INTERNET (2010).
165. Id. at 5 (“For a society to be healthy, its members must be aware of basic health risks and
be educated on how to avoid them.”).
166. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 282 (“Botnet: A network of computers that have
been forced to operate on the commands of an unauthorized remote user . . . .”).
167. Id. at 284 (“Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS): A basic cyber war technique often
used by criminals and other nonstate actors in which an Internet site, a server, or a router is flooded
with more requests for data than the site can respond to or process.”).
168. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 175.
169. New strains of Malware appear faster than one every second. Id. at 34.
170. Id. at 38.
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eat right, exercise, and take their vitamins. While public health models
should be employed online, and may help prevent attacks from low-level
hackers, something more needs to be done about high-level threats that
continually engineer new vulnerabilities.
B. Hack-Back/Active Defense
Due to the widespread security risks that exist in the cyberworld,
and the apparent inability of the government and private actors to stop
these attacks, many security experts have begun advocating for some
form of “active defense,” or hack-back.171 Unleashing these tools, proponents argue, would further two broad aims: (1) deterring hackers by punishing them with unacceptably high costs; and (2) preventing attackers
from succeeding in their current or future attacks.172
Active defense or hack-back generally involves three steps: (1) detecting the intrusion; (2) tracing the intruder; and (3) some form of counterstrike.173 For the most part, the first two steps of active defense are
generally accepted as legal means of network security. Detecting an intrusion, which is usually done within one’s own network or computer,
does not lead to any legal trouble. Because the CFAA only limits unauthorized activity, as long as you have authorization to be on the system,
you may act as you see fit, and it is nearly impossible to violate the
CFAA.
The second step—tracing and identifying the intruder—is where the
idea of hack-back, or mitigative counterstriking, becomes technologically complicated. Usually, attackers are traced using some form of
traceroute technology.174 However, depending on the type of traceroute,
correctly identifying the hacker happens, at best, 80% of the time.175 Attribution rates drop dramatically if the hacker is spoofing his IP address,
and the rates become decrease even further if the hacker is using a thirdparty command and control system.176

171. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 108, at 83; Baker, supra note 18; Kesan & Hayes, supra
note 15, at 474; McGee et al., supra note 15.
172. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 433.
173. Some distinguish active defense and hack-back; for the purposes of this paper, they are
considered synonymous, with both being defined as described. See id. at 434.
174. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 481; see also McGee et al., supra note 15, at 12.
175. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 481.
176. “‘Command and Control’ (C&C) servers are centralized machines that are able to send
commands and receive outputs of machines part of a botnet.” Command and Control Server,
RADWARE, http://security.radware.com/knowledge-center/DDoSPedia/command-and-control-server/
(last visited April 2, 2015).
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The inability to regularly identify the hacker makes the third step—
some form of counterstrike—difficult. Counterstriking can range from
things as simple as turning over the supposed hacker to law enforcement,
to damaging the system to prevent it from perpetrating future attacks.177
Hack-back has some obvious appeal. First, hack-back allows an individual to respond quickly to attacks perpetrated on his or her network,
resulting in less network downtime and greater productivity. Second, it
increases the cost of hacking and makes hackers less effective by creating barriers to entry—potentially causing some hackers to exit the game
due to ineffectiveness.
However, some argue that this would lead to a number of undesirable results, mostly resulting from the problem of attribution. Where full
hack-back was allowed (i.e. damaging or “locking” a hacker’s systems),
one can imagine a scenario where victims of cyber espionage discover an
attack on their system and begin hack-back protocols, only to discover
that they damaged the personal computer of an innocent third party used
by the hacker. Thus, a free for all vigilante framework would likely result
in significant collateral damage to innocent third parties. Even proponents of mitigative counterstriking acknowledge that the current state of
technology, particularly in respect to identifying hackers, may not be
sufficient to allow for permissive counterstriking.178
V. AN ALTERNATIVE: AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATION
This paper suggests a moderate alternative to hack-back proposals.
Under a model of authorized investigation, section (a)(2) of the CFAA—
the ban on unauthorized access for the purpose of obtaining information—should be amended to grant victims of cyberattacks criminal
and civil immunity for the limited purpose of investigating their attackers. In practice, this would mean that network security professionals,
businesses, or even private individuals who are technologically competent, would be able to use necessary means to: (1) access the attacking
computer; and (2) gather information about the attack, its perpetrator, its
origin, and its purpose—nothing more.
Opponents of this limited authorization will certainly cite the same
concerns they have regarding hack-back. First, they will argue that accurate attribution remains a problem and could damage their systems.
However, the proposed limited exemption would leave the rest of the
CFAA in effect, including civil and criminal actions for damaging sys177. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 481.
178. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 483.
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tems. If individuals are found abusing their authority and damaging systems, prosecutors could bring criminal charges or citizens could file suit
for compensatory damages. Second, opponents will likely argue that,
even if damage is not a consideration, allowing individuals and organizations to access third-party systems violates the third party’s privacy.
However, as one expert noted, once an innocent third party’s system is
taken over and used by a hacker for illicit purposes, the privacy of the
user has already been seriously violated.179
Allowing cybervictims to access and investigate the systems of
their attackers provides many benefits, both on the individual and societal level. First, allowing access helps to further the goals of attribution.
While inspecting a system, network investigators would be able to determine if the computer in question was the system that perpetrated the
attack or if it was a command and control system taking advantage of an
innocent third party. In the case of an innocent third party, investigators
could use the network logs to determine where the true hacker resides.180
Second, these investigations could reveal data about the tools and
exploits the hackers are using in their attacks. Network administrators
could use this information to further secure passive defense systems from
future attack.
Third, the ability to more accurately identify hackers could generate
significant deterrent effects. “Name and shame” tactics are especially
effective in some scenarios. By publicly declaring who the attackers are
and who they work for, international political pressure could be placed
on the origin country to prosecute hackers. Countries would no longer be
able to hide behind plausible deniability—claiming that the hackers are
not in their country. Also, the President’s new authority allows him to
impose sanctions on those known to engage in cyber espionage.181 Attribution may be the key to securing the Internet. Any tool that can responsibly increase attribution rates should be seriously considered.
Fourth, in addition to identifying the hacker, investigators could
identify for whom the hacker works and determine whether the attack
was an act of state-sponsored espionage or corporate espionage. Furthermore, investigators can more accurately determine who should ultimately be held accountable for the attack.
Fifth, this proposal aids defensive models by working to create
“healthier” Internet users. Identifying infected third parties could encour179. Baker, supra note 18.
180. The vast details of Operation Shady RAT were uncovered after investigators at McAfee
were able to inspect an infected command and control server. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 2, at 3.
181. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
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age users to clean their systems by informing them of the vulnerabilities
and damage they are causing.
Finally, granting statutory authority for investigations could help
prevent more drastic self-help methods. Some companies and individuals, frustrated at the futility of defensive measures, have already begun
utilizing mitigative counterstriking and hack-back. The potential collateral damage, and the potential shadow wars due to vigilantism, could be
avoided by granting users a little of the authority network experts seek.
In summary, authorizing investigative procedures to organizations
and individuals that have been attacked allows for greater attribution and
defense while limiting the risk of collateral damage to innocent third parties. Although some advocate for more aggressive measures, authorized
investigation would allow for increased security while testing the water
for greater individual action.
VI. CONCLUSION
We stand in a valley of moderation, and we are being attacked on
all sides. The legal system that developed around the Internet is insufficient to protect what it has become. What was designed as a collaborative tool for a small set of researchers is now the backbone for nearly
everything in modern society. The Internet manages our food distribution
systems, our water supply, our electric grids, our missile defense networks, and more. We use the Internet to manage both our personal
401(k)s and the New York Stock Exchange. The Internet is where we file
health insurance claims and purchase health plans—sending our private
medical information across unknown servers. The same system that generated unprecedented technological development and economic growth
over recent decades is also a system under attack. Hacktivists, cybercriminals, and state-sponsored cyberspies use the Internet to steal identities,
pilfer trade secrets, crash websites, and divulge national security secrets.
Countries are lacing servers and private computers with backdoors and
corrupt code waiting to supplement armed attack with cyberwar.
While current laws have brought about some successful attempts at
maintaining an orderly cyberspace, attribution and procedural problems
continue to ensure that most hackers are never held accountable for their
actions. As a result, many cyber experts are now advocating for a system
that permits hack-back, allowing private individuals and organizations to
defend themselves. Others worry that this practice will result in collateral
damage to innocent third parties because of these same attribution problems. A very limited criminal and civil exemption allowing victims of
cyberattacks to investigate their attackers could solve many issues while
limiting third-party collateral damage. By allowing victims to access
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their attacker’s computer without authorization and obtain information,
victims are able to gather the intelligence needed to defend themselves,
help secure the system more broadly, shed light on the attacker and his or
her motives, and increase the cost to hackers, all while limiting the potential for third-party collateral damage. Finally, a legally-authorized,
limited hack-back could stem the tide of growing cyber vigilantism while
providing a test case by which we can judge future cyber self-defense
proposals.

